Showing posts with label Sir Edward Grey. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sir Edward Grey. Show all posts

Wednesday, 6 August 2014

August 6

Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia, and Serbia declares war against Germany.

HMS Amphion sunk in the North Sea by a floating mine. 150 British sailors were lost, and 18 crew rescued from the Konigen Luise, sunk the previous day.

Many of the survivors were taken to a military hospital in Harwich. A journalist recorded (on August 14), "The Amphion's men were dreadfully burned and scalded. They have marks on their faces and bodies which resemble the splashes of an acid. Of the British seamen in hospital, 13 are suffering from severe burns, five from less serious burns, two from the effects of lyddite fumes, and one each from concussion, severe injury, slight wounds, shock and slight burns."

HMS Amphion - the first British ship sunk in the First World War

The SS City of Winchester becomes the first British merchant ship to be lost during the First World War when a German boarding party from the German light cruiser, Konigsberg, seized control of the vessel off the coast of Oman. The City of Winchester is ordered to head for a group of island nearby. The merchant ship was later sunk (see August 12).

The SMS Konigsberg, which seized the SS City of Winchester


Lord Kitchener asks for 500,000 recruits for the Army, 100,000 to be raised forthwith. This immediate target was achieved within two weeks

A vote of credit for £100,000,000 is agreed by the House of Commons without a division. This was, in effect, Parliamentary sanction of the declaration of war on 4 August. Grey's ultimatum was sent only with the sanction of the Prime Minister, Asquith, and the Cabinet was only informed afterwards.

Monday, 4 August 2014

August 4: The lamps are going out all over Europe...

King George V
Germany declares war on Belgium and German troops being their attack on the Liege forts.

Admiral Sir John Jellicoe is appointed in command of the Home Fleets.

Britain's ultimatum to Germany expires resulting in Britain's declaration of war.

In his memoirs, Sir Edward Grey recalls, "That evening some of us sat with the Prime Minister in the Cabinet Room in 10 Downing Street. I was there in touch with the Foreign Office to certify that no satisfactory reply had come from Berlin, though this was, after all that had happened, a forgeone conclusion and matter of form. Churchill also was among those present, ready at the appointed hour to send out the war order, that the fleet were expecting. Midnight came. We were at war."

At the Admiralty, Winston Churchill waited as the minutes passed slowly. He later wrote, "It was 11 o'clock at night - 12 by German time - when the ultimatum expired. The windows of the Admiralty were thrown wide open in the warm night air. Under the roof from which Nelson had received his orders were gathered a small group of Admirals and Captains and a cluster of clerks, pencil in hand, waiting. Along the Mall from the direction of the Palace the sound of an immense concourse singing 'God save the King' floated in. On this deep wave there broke the chimes of Big Ben; and, as the first stroke of the hour boomed out, a rustle of movement swept across the room. The war telegram, which meant 'Commence hostilities against Germany', was flashed to the ships and establishments under the White Ensign all over the world."

Mobilisation of the army begins. Reserves and Territorials are called up.

The Government takes control of the railways. Henceforth the railways are operated by the Railway Executive Committee - a committee of railway managers - with the Government guaranteeing the railway companies' 1913 dividends. During the war, the Government paid £95 million to the railways, although this traffic would have cost £100 million at pre-war rates.

Sir Edward Grey
Regarding Sir Edward Grey's famous comment about the lamps going out, he recalled, "A friend came to see me on one of the evenings of the last week - he thinks it was on Monday, August 3. We were standing at a window of my room in the Foreign Office. It was getting dusk, and the lamps were being lit in the space below on which we were looking. My friend recalls that I remarked on this with the words: "The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our life-time."

Sunday, 3 August 2014

August 3

King Albert
Germany declares war on France, and German troops enter Belgium. King Albert sends a "supreme appeal" to King George V regarding Belgium's neutrality.


In the Reichstag, Bethmann-Hollweg declared that, "The wrong we are committing we will endeavour to make good as soon as our military goal is reached."

German troops cross the Russian border, occupying Bedzin, Kalisz and Czestochowa.

In Britain, the decision for war begins to focus over Belgian neutrality. Until now, there was no clear majority in the Cabinet for war. There was no formal treaty of alliance with France or Russia. But Belgian neutrality raised a complication, for Belgian neutrality was guaranteed by Britain under the Treaty of London (1839). Therefore an ultimatum was sent from London to Berlin demanding an assurance that Germany will respect Belgian neutrality, due to expire at 11pm on 4 August.

In the House of Commons, Sir Edward Grey explained the Government's position regarding Belgian neutrality, "Last week I stated that we were working for peace not only for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe... It now appears from the news I have received to-day - which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form - that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium ... We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether if a guarantee were given that, after the war, Belgium integrity would be preserved that would content us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality.

"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin.

"We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end... I do not believe for a moment, that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the West of Europe opposite to us - if that had been the result of the war - falling under the domination of a single Power."

Sir Edward Grey
In his memoirs, Sir Edward Grey contrasted the issues raised by the German invasion of Luxembourg and Belgium. The difference was that the Great Powers agreed a collective guarantee for the integrity and independence [of Luxembourg], but had bound themselves separately to defend the integrity of Belgium.

As Grey explained, "It was thus made clear that what Luxembourg had was a collective guarantee; that no one of the signatory Powers had an obligation to defend Luxembourg, unless all the signatory Powers did so; that no other Power had an obligation to act separately and without the others. This made our position quite clear; the violation of Luxembourg entailed no obligation on us to take action. We could, if we wished, make the German invasion of Luxembourg a reason for going to war, but it was not an obligation; it was a question whether the interest of Britain, not its honour, required us to act. ... [this] brought into strong relief the binding character of the guarantee of Belgium. ...

Mr Gladstone
"What we had before us was the action of Mr Gladstone's Government in 1870 ... about our obligation to Belgium. Mr Gladstone characteristically guarded himself against any unqualified admission that treaty guarantees should always in all conditions bind us to go to war in defence of them, but threw into the scale of British obligation to defend Belgium a tremendous assertion that this was required by a policy and a morality that were independent of time or circumstances. ... For, if her neutrality were violated, and the violation submitted to by Belgium and acquiesced in by her guarantors, her independence was gone for ever. She must become a satellite and serf of the great neighbour who had used her as he pleased. It would have been proved that she had a master, and had no friends able or willing to help her. ... As it became more and more certain that the German Army was going to invade Belgium, the Cabinet began all to face the same way ..."

Thursday, 31 July 2014

July 31

Signatures on the Treaty of London (1839)
Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia, confident that Germany will support her.

Germany prepares to declare war on Russia, but asks France to declare it would remain neutral in the event of a war between Germany and Russia. Bound by her treaty with Russia, France refuses and prepares to mobilise.

Britain asks France and Germany to respect Belgian neutrality, which is protected by the Treaty of London, signed in 1839 by the Great Powers. France pledges to do so; Germany makes no reply.

In his memoirs, Sir Edward Grey describes this action as taking "a diplomatic step that contemplated the contingency of war." He went on, "The step now taken in London was in close accord with the attitude of Mr Gladstone's Government in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. On that occasion both France and Germany agreed to respect Belgian neutrality. This time France agreed, Germany evaded the request for an assurance."

Sir Edward Grey
Grey reflected, "It seemed to me that Germany had precipitated war. My reading of the situation at the time was that Austria had gone recklessly ahead against Serbia, believing that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be repeated; that she could humiliate Serbia and that Russia would, as in 1909, recoil before the "shining armour" of Germany and that there would be no great war. When Austria found that the parallel of 1909 was not to be repeated and that things were serious, she began to try to get out of it. Germany then precipitated war and told Austria that, as an Ally, she could not get out. ... no Great Power could submit to a second humiliation such as ... Russia had suffered in 1909. It was precisely because Russia had recoiled in 1909 that she was sure not to abdicate her Slav role now."

Sunday, 27 July 2014

July 27 - Further steps

General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien
On the basis of Serbia's reply to the ultimatum, Czar Nicholas proposes the opening of negotiations with Austria-Hungary. This proposal is rejected by Vienna.

On the same day, Sir Edward Grey tried to convene a conference between Britain, Germany, France and Italy "for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications". The proposal was vetoed by Germany on the grounds that such a conference was not "practicable".

The British War Office instructs General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien to guard vulnerable points in southern Britain.

John Burns, the President of the Board of Trade, recorded in his diary, "Why four great powers should fight over Serbia no fellow can understand."

John Burns
He felt war must be averted by "all the means in our power", and that it was his especial duty to "dissociate myself and the principles I hold, and the trusteeship for the working classes which I carry" from such as crime as any declaration of war will be.

Wednesday, 23 July 2014

July 23 - The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum

Austro-Hungarian Flag
Following the assurances given by Germany, the Austro-Hungarians presented their ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July. They demanded a reply within 48 hours.

The ultimatum comprised a list of demands upon the Serbian government.  It assumed that the Serbian government was implicated in the events at Sarajevo. The ultimatum was presented by the Austrian government to Belgrade on Thursday 23 July 1914 at 6pm.  A response was demanded within two days, ie by 6pm on Saturday 25 July.

The principal demands were:

(1) To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity
(2) To dissolve immediately the society styled "Narodna Odbrana," to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Serbia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.  The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form
(3) To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary
(4) To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government
(5) To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;
(6) To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th of June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto
(7) To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Serbian State employee, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo
(8) To prevent by effective measures the cooperation of the Serbian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Shabatz Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;
(9) To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian officials, both in Serbia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th of June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,
(10) To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.


Sir Edward Grey, Britain's Foreign Secretary
In his memoirs (Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916, London: 1925) Sir Edward Grey, Britain's Foreign Secretary, commented:

"At length, but suddenly at the last, came the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia: unexpectedly severe; harsher in tone and more humiliating in its terms than any communication of which we had recollection addressed by one independent Government to another.

"The Austrian ultimatum was not supported by any evidence of complicity of the Serbian authorities in the murder, and it appeared that both the assassins arrested were Austrian subjects. One of them had already been regarded as an undesirable by Serbia; ... All this gave rise to a strong feeling that Serbia was being dealt with more harshly than was just."