Showing posts with label Gladstone. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Gladstone. Show all posts

Sunday, 3 August 2014

August 3

King Albert
Germany declares war on France, and German troops enter Belgium. King Albert sends a "supreme appeal" to King George V regarding Belgium's neutrality.


In the Reichstag, Bethmann-Hollweg declared that, "The wrong we are committing we will endeavour to make good as soon as our military goal is reached."

German troops cross the Russian border, occupying Bedzin, Kalisz and Czestochowa.

In Britain, the decision for war begins to focus over Belgian neutrality. Until now, there was no clear majority in the Cabinet for war. There was no formal treaty of alliance with France or Russia. But Belgian neutrality raised a complication, for Belgian neutrality was guaranteed by Britain under the Treaty of London (1839). Therefore an ultimatum was sent from London to Berlin demanding an assurance that Germany will respect Belgian neutrality, due to expire at 11pm on 4 August.

In the House of Commons, Sir Edward Grey explained the Government's position regarding Belgian neutrality, "Last week I stated that we were working for peace not only for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe... It now appears from the news I have received to-day - which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form - that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium ... We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether if a guarantee were given that, after the war, Belgium integrity would be preserved that would content us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality.

"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin.

"We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end... I do not believe for a moment, that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the West of Europe opposite to us - if that had been the result of the war - falling under the domination of a single Power."

Sir Edward Grey
In his memoirs, Sir Edward Grey contrasted the issues raised by the German invasion of Luxembourg and Belgium. The difference was that the Great Powers agreed a collective guarantee for the integrity and independence [of Luxembourg], but had bound themselves separately to defend the integrity of Belgium.

As Grey explained, "It was thus made clear that what Luxembourg had was a collective guarantee; that no one of the signatory Powers had an obligation to defend Luxembourg, unless all the signatory Powers did so; that no other Power had an obligation to act separately and without the others. This made our position quite clear; the violation of Luxembourg entailed no obligation on us to take action. We could, if we wished, make the German invasion of Luxembourg a reason for going to war, but it was not an obligation; it was a question whether the interest of Britain, not its honour, required us to act. ... [this] brought into strong relief the binding character of the guarantee of Belgium. ...

Mr Gladstone
"What we had before us was the action of Mr Gladstone's Government in 1870 ... about our obligation to Belgium. Mr Gladstone characteristically guarded himself against any unqualified admission that treaty guarantees should always in all conditions bind us to go to war in defence of them, but threw into the scale of British obligation to defend Belgium a tremendous assertion that this was required by a policy and a morality that were independent of time or circumstances. ... For, if her neutrality were violated, and the violation submitted to by Belgium and acquiesced in by her guarantors, her independence was gone for ever. She must become a satellite and serf of the great neighbour who had used her as he pleased. It would have been proved that she had a master, and had no friends able or willing to help her. ... As it became more and more certain that the German Army was going to invade Belgium, the Cabinet began all to face the same way ..."

Thursday, 31 July 2014

July 31

Signatures on the Treaty of London (1839)
Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia, confident that Germany will support her.

Germany prepares to declare war on Russia, but asks France to declare it would remain neutral in the event of a war between Germany and Russia. Bound by her treaty with Russia, France refuses and prepares to mobilise.

Britain asks France and Germany to respect Belgian neutrality, which is protected by the Treaty of London, signed in 1839 by the Great Powers. France pledges to do so; Germany makes no reply.

In his memoirs, Sir Edward Grey describes this action as taking "a diplomatic step that contemplated the contingency of war." He went on, "The step now taken in London was in close accord with the attitude of Mr Gladstone's Government in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. On that occasion both France and Germany agreed to respect Belgian neutrality. This time France agreed, Germany evaded the request for an assurance."

Sir Edward Grey
Grey reflected, "It seemed to me that Germany had precipitated war. My reading of the situation at the time was that Austria had gone recklessly ahead against Serbia, believing that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be repeated; that she could humiliate Serbia and that Russia would, as in 1909, recoil before the "shining armour" of Germany and that there would be no great war. When Austria found that the parallel of 1909 was not to be repeated and that things were serious, she began to try to get out of it. Germany then precipitated war and told Austria that, as an Ally, she could not get out. ... no Great Power could submit to a second humiliation such as ... Russia had suffered in 1909. It was precisely because Russia had recoiled in 1909 that she was sure not to abdicate her Slav role now."